Over the last three decades, the number (enterprise value) of leveraged buyout transactions involving privately held targets has totaled about 10,013 deals ($855 billion), accounting for 46% (21%) of the worldwide leveraged buyout market. Yet the vast majority of academic studies focus on the buyouts of publicly held targets. This paper investigates the motives and consequences of leveraged buyouts involving 169 private firms in the U.K. I find that private firms with large growth and investment opportunities seek partnership with private equity sponsors to change the ownership structure and capitalize on those opportunities: In contrast to the buyouts of public firms, private targets sponsored by private equity firms grow in size through larger investments in fixed assets and acquisitions subsequent to the buyouts. However, private targets undergoing leveraged buyouts without private equity sponsors do not experience substantial changes in ownership structure and do not increase in firm size and investments ex post. The evidence is consistent with the view that private equity sponsored leverage buyouts not only serve as an exit for owners, but also relieve private firms' investment constraint by diffusing ownership structure and providing financing for new investments and growth.
I. Introduction
The volume of leveraged buyouts involving privately held targets far exceed that of publicly held targets. Strömberg (2007) documents that over the last three decades about 65% (42.4%) of the worldwide buyout deals are the acquisitions of private companies, whereas those of public companies account for 7% (28.2%) in terms of the number of deals (targets' enterprise value).
2 Even during the late 1980s which was, arguably, the heyday of private equity, private-to-private buyouts made up almost 70% (33%) of the leveraged buyout market, while public-to-private deals accounted for 8. 6% (49%) . 3 Yet the voluminous existing studies have dominantly examined public-to-private leveraged buyouts 4 and, in some studies, leveraged buyouts are even viewed equivalent as "going private" transactions. Importantly, the argument for the economic gains of leveraged buyouts largely bears on the assumption that targets of buyouts are public companies with diffused ownership structure.
5
The goal of this paper is to shed light on this unexplored but economically important sector of the buyout market. To infer the motivations and goals of a leveraged buyout, I examine the ex ante characteristics and the ex post restructuring process of privately held target companies. Specifically I investigate the leveraged buyouts of privately held targets in the United Kingdom (UK).
6 2 Leveraged buyouts of private firms include both the acquisitions of independent private firms and those of portfolio firms owned by private equity firms.
The UK market provides two advantages: First, the stringent disclosure and financial reporting environment in the UK 3 See Table 1 which I reproduced based on Table 2 in Strömberg (2007) 4 This undue emphasis on public-to-private buyouts may be ascribed to several high profile deals involving public companies such as RJR Nabisco ($31.1b in 1988,) , Beatrice ($6.1b in 1985) , and, more recently, HCA ($32.7b in 2006) , and TXU ($43.8b in 2007) -see http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/the-top-10-buyouts/ -and to the lack of publicly available financial data for privately held-targets and "gone" private companies through a leveraged buyout in the US. 5 Notably, Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989 argues that going-private leveraged buyouts increase firm value by reducing agency costs arising from diverging goals of owners and professional managers in public companies. Subsequent empirical findings, usually based on the sample of public-to-private deals, also support this notion: Managerial compensation is restructured to align managers' interests with owners' and high leverage and close monitoring by investors reduce inefficient resource wastes (Baker 1992; Baker and Wruck; 1989) . Firms with abundant free cash flow with low investment opportunities are more likely to engage in a leveraged buyout (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989, Opler and Titman, 1991) and, after a leveraged buyout, operating performance and plant productivity improve (Kaplan, 1988; Smith, 1989; Litchenberg and Siegel, 1989; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990 among others) . 6 My sample does not include divisional buyouts and distressed buyouts primarily due to unavailability of information. Divisions of a larger corporation do not usually provide financial information before a buyout and bankrupt companies are struck off the registrar and stop publishing annual reports.
allow me to observe the characteristics of privately held targets and what companies actually "do" in the post-buyout period. 7 Second, the UK leveraged buyout market is the second largest market next to the US in the world, making it possible to examine a large sample. 8 Obviously, and as I also show in this paper, the traditional agency problem associated with the separation of ownership and control is less likely found in a private company because ownership is highly concentrated and managers own substantial shares of the company. Therefore, unlike public firms, increasing firm value through the reduction of inefficiencies arisen from agency problem is not an important motivation and goal of a leveraged buyout for private firms.
However, leveraged buyouts can be an important tool for private firms with large current and future growth opportunities, but with investment constraints. Private firms could face investment constraint imposed by highly concentrated ownership and lack of financing. Leveraged buyouts can alleviate this investment constraint by providing a whole or partial exit for the owners and reducing owners' risk exposure to additional risky investments. Also private equity firms partnering with target companies can help alleviate financial constraint of the targets by direct capital injection, or mitigating information asymmetry through due diligence, close monitoring, and their reputation in the capital markets. In addition, private equity firms can bring in advanced management skills and industry networks, and help achieve growth and expansion strategies.
Using 266 leveraged buyouts from 1998 to 2007 in the UK of which 169 deals involve private target and 97 public targets, I find evidence largely consistent with this view. I first document that, not surprisingly, ownership is indeed highly concentrated in privately held targets. The average ownership of the largest owner prior to buyouts is 86% and most of these owners (97%) are also managers of the companies. Second, leveraged buyouts serve as an exit route for these owner-managers: the average ownership of the owner-managers drop to 7% after the buyouts. The median number of shareholders also 7 The UK company laws require all limited liability companies (both private and public) to file periodic reports with the Companies House. See Ball et al (2005) , Brav (2009), Roberts and Michaely (2007) for detailed explanation for disclosure regulation for U.K. companies. Also see the U.K. Companies House for the Companies Act. 8 The leveraged buyouts involving UK companies account for 41% of all European deals (Strömberg, 2007) increases from 2 to 6. Therefore, ownership structure substantially changes through leveraged buyouts. In particular, when target companies partner with private equity sponsors, these changes are more pronounced.
The evidence also suggests that when private firms have large investment opportunities (in terms of current sales growth and cash saving) but face restriction due to highly concentrated ownership, they invite private equity firms and alter the ownership structure through leveraged buyouts. Private targets sponsored by private equity firms are very profitable relative to peer private firms prior to leveraged buyouts: the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to sales ratio of private targets and peer private firms (median value) are 0.12 and 0.04, respectively. Also private targets are holding more cash and grow faster than peer private firms: the cash holding to sales ratio and sales growth of private targets (peer private firms) is 0.14 (0.05) and 0.17 (0.06). The propensity to cash saving which is defined as the ratio of the change in cash from year -2 to -1 (relative to the year of the buyouts)
to cash flows during the same period is also higher among private targets than peer private firms: 0.30 vs.
0.04.
After the buyouts, private targets with private equity sponsors considerably grow in firm size by making large investments in fixed assets and acquisitions: Industry adjusted sales grow by 25%, the number of employees by 27%, and capital expenditures by 87% from one year before the buyouts to one year after the buyouts. This finding is distinctively different from the post-buyout restructuring and value creation process involving publicly held targets (Kaplan, 1988; Smith, 1989; Wiersema and Liebeckind ,1995 among others) . By comparison, 30% of private targets complete the buyouts without partnering with private equity firms. Owner-managers of these private targets simply transfer ownership to existing managers or family successors without substantially changing the ownership structure. After the buyouts, these private targets do not show as much growth in firm size and investments as private targets sponsored by private equity firms.
To see the extent of acquisitions and disposals activities of target companies, I compute the sum of all cash outflows (inflows) associated with acquisitions (disposals) under leveraged buyout ownership and divide this sum by tangible assets at the most recent fiscal year-end before the buyouts. There is a statically and economically significant difference between private and public targets: The median acquisition related cash outflow to tangible fixed assets ratio of private targets is 0.644 and that of public targets is 0.039; the median disposal related cash inflow to tangible fixed assets ratios are 0.00 and 0.026 for private and public targets, respectively.
I also examine post-buyout operating performance. Though the level of EBITDA increases, operating efficiency does not improve among private targets after the buyouts. However, when I compare private targets with private equity sponsors and those without sponsors, I find a stark difference between the two groups. Operating performance and efficiency are increasing fast before the buyouts for private targets sponsored by private equity firms. However, though EBITDA continues to increase, operating efficiency decreases after the buyouts. On the contrary, targets without private equity partnership show the opposite behavior. The changes in operating performance and efficiency before the buyouts are smaller than peer private firms. Yet, after the buyouts, the targets improve operating efficiency substantially: By the end of second year after the buyouts, EBITDA to sales ratio increase by 47%.
On balance, private firms with large investment opportunities partner with private equity firms to change ownership structure and capitalize on growth opportunities. After the buyouts they grow in firm size, but they do not improve operating efficiency. By contrast, when owner-managers of private firms need to liquidate their ownership, they can also engage in leveraged buyouts to transfer ownership. In this case, targets improve operating efficiency after the buyouts but do not necessarily expand their businesses.
Lastly, I investigate why owner-managers of target firms choose leveraged buyouts rather than public offerings (IPOs) to exit their ownership. IPOs are alternative route through which owners can liquidate her stake and distribute equity share to large number of investors. Therefore, firms can lift up their investment constraint due to concentrated ownership. However, I find that the majority of private targets are considerably smaller than firms listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), suggesting that they are too small or informationally risky to distribute equity share to public.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II develops testable hypotheses followed by Section III where I describe the data and some institutional background of UK buyout market. Section IV presents main results. Section VI concludes.
II. Hypotheses development
Private companies are different from public corporations in a number of dimensions. Particularly, in private companies, entrepreneurs or owners are usually the managers of the companies or the ownership structure is highly concentrated with a few hands such as founders, angel investors, and venture capitalists. These owners perform close monitoring on the management and managerial incentive mechanisms are tightly structured to protect the owners' wealth from the managers' expropriation (e.g. Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) . Therefore, the agency problems associated with the incentive misalignment between owners and managers are less likely found in private companies.
Consequently, eliminating these agency costs (Jensen, 1986 (Jensen, , 1989 ) is less likely an important cause and consequence of a leveraged buyout for a private company as it does for a public company.
Second, private companies, compared to public ones, have limited or costly access to public resources imposed by ownership structure and information asymmetry. Other things being equal, when facing an investment opportunity, managers of private companies will find it difficult to implement the investment because, first, owners with substantially undiversified wealth tied up with the firm do not want to take additional risks associated with the new investment. Second, the existing managers may not possess an intimate knowledge and expertise to execute the new investment (e.g. when entering into a new market). Lastly, the firm can be financially constrained in the sense that it does not have enough internal and external financing to capitalize on new investment opportunities.
Leveraged buyouts can help resolving these problems by providing the whole or partial exit for the owners (thereby lowering the ownership of and reducing the risk exposure to the owners), mitigating financial constraint by reducing information uncertainty through financial sponsors' due diligence and their reputation in the capital markets or directly injecting capital, and importing advanced management skills (e.g. operational knowledge and the expertise on corporate control market) and industry and regional networks into the target companies.
By contrast, a public company taking the firm private through a leveraged buyout is less likely resource-constrained. One of the main reasons that a firm goes public is to tap public capital market and to exploit current and future investment opportunities (e.g. Kim and Weisbach, 2007) . Hence, a public company may pursue a leveraged buyout and go private because it does not need public resources anymore. Also public status provides an opportunity to engage in mergers and acquisitions (which is a major investment for a company) by creating the currency of shares for acquisitions (Brau, Francis, and Kohers, 2005, Brau and Fawcett, 2006) or by establishing a market value for the firm (Zingales, 1995 , Mello and Parsons, 2000 , Brau and Fawcett, 2006 . Therefore, these theories suggest that a firm without large growth investment opportunities, without need for large capital, and without demand for corporate control activities will more likely go private (Bharath and Dittmar, 2008) .
In sum, consistent with the traditional argument in support of leveraged buyouts, public firms are more likely to pursue (or forced to pursue) leveraged buyouts in response to agency problem than private firms. On the other hand, private firms unlike public ones tend to engage in leveraged buyouts to relieve their resource constraint and capitalize on growth opportunities.
To put the discussion into perspective, consider the following model based on Stein (2001): A firm chooses the level of investment to maximize the net present value. The gross return to an investment, , is given by a production function, , which is an increasing and concave function. Investment can be financed either with internal resources, , or with external funds, . Thus, the budge constraint is
In a first-best world without agency problem and costly external financing, the firm would choose to maximize,
The optimal investment level is Now assume that there are deadweight costs associated with the use of external funds given by where is a measure of financing friction and is increasing and convex. Also assume that managers can enjoy private benefits from gross investment output by , where is a measure of the intensity of agency conflict. Then the firm chooses an investment level to maximize,
Case 1 : Suppose that a public firm seeks to go private through a leveraged buyout because it has few new investment plans and no longer need to engage in the corporate control market (the costs of being public outweighs the benefits). This implies that the firm is not financially constrained since it does not need much external financing, i.e., or Due to its diffused ownership and the separation of owners and managers (agency conflict is potentially severe), the manager chooses investment sub-optimally.
Especially, if managers take private benefit of control from large investment output (or firm size), i.e., , the company is making over-investment relative to the first-best optimal level of investment, .
Case 2 : Assume that a private company has (no agency problem) and, instead, faces greater financing friction, , due to its information opaqueness. In this case, the optimal investment level is less than the first-best optimal investment, If the owner is risk averse towards additional risky investment because her wealth is under-diversified (negative in (2)), the underinvestment problem worsens.
Therefore, after the buyout, companies with greater agency problem and without much further need for external financing (Case 1) can correct investment distortion and increase firm value by reducing , whereas those with greater external financing costs and less agency problem, but with risk-averse owners (Case 2) may increase firm value by reducing or increasing (i.e. reducing the absolute value of negative ).
I expect that public targets (which represent companies replete with agency problem and without much extra investment opportunities) could correct overinvestment problem by increasing managerial ownership (reducing ). This group of companies, hence, tends to engage in restructuring process of reducing investment inefficiencies arising from agency problem such as reversing previous investment through divestitures and reducing capital expenditures after the buyouts. On the other hand, private targets (which represent companies with ownership and financial constraints and without much agency problem)
would be able to correct underinvestment problem by reducing owners' ownership or by receiving financial sponsors' certification in the capital markets through a leveraged buyout. Therefore, more acquisitions and more investment are expected in post-buyout period. The discussion leads us to the following set of testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Privately held targets are more likely to increase investment and acquisitions after buyouts than publicly held targets.
Hypothesis 2: Publicly held targets are more likely to engage in asset sales and divestment of operating after buyouts.
In particular, when leveraged buyouts are sponsored by private equity firms, private targets will be able to grow more after the buyouts. In other words, private firms with large growth opportunities and need for large financing to fund the growth could alleviate ownership and financial constraint by partnering with financial sponsors through leveraged buyouts. House. This process is complicated by significant changes in corporate structure after buyouts. In Figure   1 , a typical leveraged buyout transaction is depicted. Table 2 shows the industry distribution of the buyout transactions.
Not surprisingly, the majority of targets of leveraged buyouts are in manufacturing or services sectors. 
Panel C of

IV. Empirical results
Pre-buyout ownership and owners' characteristics
In this section, I examine the ownership structure of private target companies before the buyouts and how the structure changes through leveraged buyouts.
Panel A Table 3 reports the ownership structure of 114 private targets prior to buyouts where ownership information can be identified from companies' annual return documents. 12 As expected, the ownership is highly concentrated to a few shareholders. The average (median) number of shareholders of private targets is 3.51 (2). Thirty one percent of 141 private targets are owned by single owners.
13
The table also reports departing owner-managers' age and incoming managers' (who led the leveraged buyouts) age. In median, departing owner-managers are 11 years older than incoming managers: 56 vs. 45. I also compare owner-managers' age in target with and without private equity firms.
Among 169 deals, 112 deals (66.2%) are sponsored by private equity firms and 57 deals (33.7%) are completed by managers without private equity firms' sponsoring. Owner-managers of private targets sponsored by private equity are 6 years younger than those of private targets without private equity sponsors: 55 vs. 61. This may imply that when firms need to transfer ownership for some strategic
The average (median) ownership of the largest owners is 86% (100%). In 110 firms out of 113 targets, the largest owners are also directors (chairman or managing director) of the firms. In one case, the founder family member who has the largest ownership is not involved in the management. In two cases, venture capital firms are the largest owners. Therefore, the majority of the private target firms are the JensenMeckling's (1976) zero-agency cost firms.
reasons (not for owner-managers' retirement), they partner with private equity firms to complete leveraged buyouts.
Pre-buyout financial characteristics
Private targets vs. public targets vs. industry peer firms
I investigate how private and public targets are different from each other and from their respective peer companies in terms of financial characteristics prior to leveraged buyouts.
Peer companies are constructed as follows: First, among all UK companies in Amadeus, I select firms providing consolidated financial statements. I drop firms where only unconsolidated statements are available because, first, unconsolidated statements do not provide the fair view of the whole business and, second, I collect financial data of leveraged buyouts firms mostly from their consolidated statements. I collect information from unconsolidated statements only when the target companies do not have materially important subsidiaries. Therefore, to make an apple-to-apple comparison, I select firms with consolidated accounts. Next, I exclude firm-year observations where a firm-year is involved in acquisitions or initial public offerings within two-year window surrounding the firm-year. Lastly, using first two digits of SIC number, I match each firm-year of leveraged buyout firms with peer firms in the same industry.
Panel A in Table 4 shows various measures of firm size and firm age. Not surprisingly, private targets are considerably smaller and younger than public targets. All firm size measures (total assets, sales, property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and the number of employees) are greater in public firms than in private firms at fiscal year-end before the buyouts. Private targets are also smaller than their industry peer private firms, but older than peer private firms. Private targets are about the half the size of peer private firms and slightly older than peer firms by 2 years.
Panel B in Table 3 presents targets' profitability, cash holding, sales growth, and cash saving.
Profitability and growth measures suggest that private targets are outperforming both their peer private companies and public target companies in the period leading to buyouts: Private targets' operating income and cash flow (EBITDA) far exceed those of peer private companies. Operating income to sales ratio of private targets at fiscal year-end prior to buyouts is 0.09 and the median of operating income to sales ratios of peer private firms is 0.03. Also EBITDA to sales ratios of private targets and peer private firms are 0.11 and 0.04, respectively. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Private targets are also holding more cash than peer firms: cash holding to sales ratios are 0.13 and 0.04, respectively. Also private targets are growing faster than peer companies in terms of sales growth from year -2 to year -1 (0.13 vs. 0.05).
Private targets prior to leveraged buyouts save 30% of the generated cash flows, while peer In sum, private targets are considerably different from their peer private firms as well as public targets. After making industry adjustment, private targets are not significantly different from public targets with regard to firm size, leverage, and capital expenditure. However, private targets are more profitable, save more cash, grow faster, and save more cash than public targets after industry adjustment.
To confirm this conjecture on future financing needs for growth, I examine post-buyout investment and restructuring process in the next Section.
Private targets with private equity sponsors vs. private targets without private equity sponsors
In Table 5 , I compare financial characteristics of private targets with private equity sponsors and without private equity sponsors.
In terms of firm size and capital structure, there is not much difference between the two groups of private targets (Panel A and C). However, Panel B shows that targets with private equity sponsors are much more profitable, growing fasters, and saving more cash out of cash flows. The industry adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio of targets with sponsors is 0.09 and that of targets without sponsors is 0.01. Also the industry adjusted sales growth of targets with sponsors and those without sponsors are 0.13 and -0.02, respectively. Though statistically insignificantly different, sponsored targets save more cash than nonsponsored targets: 0.31 vs. 0.08. To the extent that current sale growth and cash saving predict future growth and investment opportunities, the evidence suggests that private targets with large investment opportunities are more likely to partner with private equity sponsors to transfer ownership from ownermanager to other investors and reshape ownership structure. In the next section, I investigate whether this inference based on ex-ante target characteristics is consistent with ex-post restructuring and investment behavior.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the estimate of logistic regression to predict being leveraged buyout targets. Dependent variable in the logistic regression in Panel A is a binary variable equal to 1 for target firms and 0 for industry peer non-target firms. Consistent with the univariate statistics in Table 4 , smaller, fast growing, and more profitable firms are more likely to be targets of leveraged buyouts. In Panel B I estimate logistic regression only for private targets to predict the likelihood of being sponsored by private equity firms. Again the results are largely consistent with the univariate statistics in Table 5 . Larger, more profitable, and more cash saving targets are more likely to partner with private equity sponsors. Though existing management is not involved in the transaction, they continue to engage in the management even after the buyouts.
Post-buyout organizational changes and restructuring processes
Ownership structure
It is obvious that leveraged buyouts provide liquidity ("exit") for the owners. Though we cannot directly observe why the owner-managers want to exit from the business, a modest fraction (23.5%) of owner-managers is older than 65 years, suggesting that they seem to want to retire. Through the transactions, ownership is transferred to the larger number of shareholders including existing managers and private equity firms. This change in the ownership structure is distinctively different from the change in public firms undergoing leveraged buyouts.
Panel B and C report the changes in ownership structure for targets without and with sponsors separately. The median number of shareholders increases by 2 among private targets without sponsors and by 5 among private targets with sponsors. The 1st quartile and 3rd quartile number of shareholders also show the same pattern. It seems when private equity firms sponsor the leveraged buyouts, ownership structure becomes modestly more diffused among larger number of investors. Table 7 provides summary statistics for the changes in firm size, capital expenditure, and capital structure from two years before the buyouts to three years after the buyouts.
Firm size, capital expenditure, and acquisitions and disposals
Measuring firm size surrounding the time of a leveraged buyout is complicated due to fair value adjustment to the book value of assets. Tangible fixed assets and current assets including stocks (inventories) and creditors (account payable) are fair-value adjusted on completion of the buyouts. Also, typically, positive goodwill is generated to reflect the purchase price paid for the target's assets (as a result, intangible fixed asset size increases) and, subsequently, these write-ups are depreciated or amortized over the ensuing years.
Therefore, to make a fair comparison between assets in pre-buyout period and those in postbuyout period, I adjust the book value of total assets by subtracting write-ups and goodwill generated at the time of the buyout transactions. One limitation of this approach is that I can understate the size of assets after the buyouts. Since write-ups and goodwill are depreciated or amortized after the buyouts, subtracting write-ups and goodwill generated at the time of the transaction from the book value of assets at each fiscal year-end will underestimate the book value of assets. Adding back depreciation and amortization to the book value of assets in each year will not do justice because depreciation and amortization also include those not associated with write-ups and goodwill due to the buyouts. Hence, to
give as fair a view as possible, I also provide other measures of firm size such as sales and the number of employees. Table 7 shows that private targets substantially increase total assets, sales, PPE, and the number of employees after the buyouts. For example, from year -1 to year +1, the industry adjusted sales and the number of employees of private targets increase by 17 and 22%, respectively. Public targets, on the other hand, reduce firm size. Industry adjusted sales and the number of employees are -22 and -16 percent, respectively.
I also examine the changes in capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is the net cash flows from the purchases and sales of fixed assets. Private targets markedly increase capital expenditure especially during the first year after the buyouts, whereas public targets reduce investments on fixed assets in general. During the first year after the buyouts, industry adjusted capital expenditures of private targets increase by 51%, but those of public targets decrease by 49%. The median total debt increases by 83, 105, and 112% from year -1 to year +1, +2, and +3, respectively.
Lastly, to see the extent of acquisitions and disposals activities of target companies, I compute the sum of all cash outflows (inflows) associated with acquisitions (disposals) from the time of a leveraged buyout to exit (when the firm exited private equity ownership) or to the fiscal year where the targets publish financial statements, and divide this sum by PPE at the most recent fiscal year end before the buyouts. Also, importantly, I exclude cash outflows associated with the leveraged buyouts. In other words, the intensities of acquisitions and disposals activities are estimated by the following measures: Table 8 presents the results. The median acquisition related cash outflow to PPE ratio of private targets is 0.66 and that of public targets is 0.043, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Also the median disposal related cash inflow to PPE ratios are 0.00 and 0.017 for private and public targets, respectively. Therefore, private targets engage in active add-on acquisition activities after the buyouts than public targets do.
In Table 9 , I again compare the changes in firm size, investment, and capital expenditures for private targets with and without sponsors. I find that private targets sponsored by private equity firms go through more substantial increase in firm size and investment after the buyouts. For example, during the first year after the buyouts, the industry adjusted sales and the number of employees grow by 7 and 4%
for private targets without sponsors. However, the respective values increase by 25 and 27% for private targets with sponsors. The changes in capital expenditure also shows similar pattern after the buyouts. Targets sponsored by private equity firms also grow more after the buyouts than targets without private equity sponsors.
Median regression of firm growth on firm characteristics
Operating performance after buyouts
In this section, I examine the operating performance after the buyouts to see whether different restructuring processes of private and public targets have different implications for operating performance in post-buyout period. The main variable of interest is EBITDA. I exclude the year when leveraged buyouts occurred in the analysis because buyout related expenses can understate operating performance in year 0 and, typically due to fiscal year-end changes, the first annual accounts after the buyouts provide information on the business from the time of buyout to new fiscal year-end which is shorter than twelve months. This makes the pre-buyout and post-buyout comparison difficult. decreases by 54% for public targets and increases by 10% for private targets. This is probably because public targets reduce and private targets increase operating assets after the buyouts.
I also examine the EBITDA to operating assets (the average of fiscal year-beginning and end current and tangible fixed assets), EBITDA to sales, and EBITDA to the number of employees. The reason I normalize EBITDA by sales or the number of employees is to mitigate the bias due to write-ups in operating assets. As firm size significantly increases after the buyouts, these measures of operating efficiencies drop for private targets. Most of the changes of operating efficiency measures are negative and not statistically significantly different from zero after controlling for industry EBITDA. For public targets, operating efficiency by and large improve after the buyouts. However, when adjusted for industry peer public firms' performance, operating efficiency improvement is not significant. Table 11 presents the changes in operating performance by two groups of private targets: one with financial sponsors and the other without financial sponsors. There is a stark difference between the two groups. Operating performance and efficiency are increasing fast before the buyouts for private targets sponsored by private equity firms. However, though EBITDA continues to increase, operating efficiency decreases among targets with private equity sponsors. On the contrary, targets without private equity partnership show the opposite properties. The changes in operating performance and efficiency before the buyouts are smaller than peer private firms. Yet, after the buyouts, the targets improve operating efficiency substantially: By the end of second year after the buyouts, EBITDA to sales ratio increase by 47%.
Summary of the findings and interpretation
First, there is a striking difference between private targets and public targets with regard to post-buyout investment policy. Consistent with previous studies based on the sample of public-to-private leveraged buyout (Kaplan, 1988; Smith, 1989) , public firms reduce firm size and investment after the buyouts. The evidence is consistent with the view that public firms reduce agency costs after leveraged buyouts by reversing previously made inefficient investments. By contrast, private targets markedly increase firm size and investment after the buyouts, a finding which suggests that these firms were investmentconstrained before the buyouts.
In principle, leveraged buyouts serve as an exit strategy for owner-managers. Owner-managers and incoming managers can complete the transaction either by themselves or with private equity sponsors. Managers of target companies with larger profitability and growth opportunities tend to invite private equity to complete leveraged buyouts and to further finance future investment plans. Ownership structure becomes more diffused in these targets. After the buyouts, these targets grow in firm size and make greater investments, rather than improving operational efficiency. This could also imply that private equity firms sponsor profitable and efficient targets with large growth opportunities. Therefore, private targets partner with private equity firms and engage in leveraged buyouts for strategic reasons.
On the other hand, target companies which complete ownership transfer through leveraged buyouts without private equity sponsors do not experience considerable changes in ownership structure.
Based on departing owner-managers' age, it seems leveraged buyouts simply serve to transfer ownership from retiring owners to new owners. These targets do not increase firm size or investment after the buyouts, but they improve operating efficiency substantially. This could be because existing managers with favorable inside information on future performance become new owners. Alternatively, high leverage might have played a role to improve organizational efficiency after the buyouts.
The increase in firm size and investment after the buyouts among private targets is not likely due to time-varying investment opportunities. In other words, new managers find new investment opportunities after the buyouts simply because the opportunities came after the buyouts. However, these increases in firm size and investment persist even after controlling for industry peer firms' firm growth and investments. To the extent that peer firms share similar investment opportunities, time-varying investment opportunities cannot explain the results.
It could be that incoming owners and managers are more competent in identifying investment opportunities. However, new management teams almost always include previous managers. In this sense, managers' ability is same before and after the buyouts. Lastly, it is possible that new owners and managers are less risk-averse, so they are more willing to take risky investment plans. For example, I find that new owner managers are about 11 year younger than departing owner-managers. To the extent that age can explain a person's risk taking attitudes, this may explain why investments increase after the buyouts for private firms. However, I find a systematic difference between private equity sponsored deals and non-sponsored deals, but owner-managers' age in the two groups of targets is, in fact, very similar: 45 vs. 48.
Hence, the evidence is most consistent with the view that private equity sponsors relieve investment constraints of private firms by resolving highly concentrated ownership through leveraged buyouts and by providing financing for growth after the buyouts.
Choice between private equity and public equity
In this section, I investigate whey owner-manager of private firms choose leveraged buyout instead of initial public offerings (IPOs) to liquidate their ownership and relieve investment constraints due to concentrated ownership structure and lack of financing. To this end, I examine financial characteristics of firms underwent leveraged buyouts and those went public on stock exchanges. 
V. Conclusion
I study the motivations and consequences leveraged buyouts of private companies. Though the buyouts of private companies account for the majority of deals in the leveraged buyout market, most academic studies base their analysis on a sample of public-to-private buyout transactions. In this respect, our understanding on leveraged buyouts -of why they occur and how firms restructure and perform after the buyouts -is still limited. This paper, by investigating private firm buyout transactions, expands our understanding on leveraged buyouts.
The most striking difference between private targets and public ones with regard to post-buyout restructuring process is found in firm growth and investments. Private targets considerably grow in firm size and make greater investments in fixed assets and acquisitions after the buyouts, which is the opposite of public targets' investments policy after the buyouts. In fact, the growth in firm size and investments are attributable to private targets with private equity sponsors. Private firms transferring ownership through leveraged buyouts without private equity firms' engagement do not show substantial increases in firm size and investment after the buyouts. I also find that though owners change, the structure of ownership does not change much for these deals without private equity firms. Therefore, for these targets, leveraged buyouts simply serve as an exit route for owners.
On the other hand, when private firms are facing large investment and growth opportunities but they are investment-constrained due to highly concentrated ownership and lack of financing, private equity sponsored leveraged buyouts can relieve these constraints and help capitalize on targets' investment opportunities. The evidence is most consistent with the view that private equity sponsoring leveraged buyouts reshape the ownership structure of private firms and provide financing to better serve future growth and investment opportunities
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to show the importance of private equity sponsors and leveraged buyouts in alleviating investment constraints for private firms with large growth opportunities. # of deals 1969 -1979 1980 -1989 1990 -1999 This table presents and compares financial characteristics of "private" target companies which are sponsored by private equity firms and those which are not sponsored by private equity firms. Financial information is at fiscal year-end before the buyouts. Panel A shows the median value of total assets, sales, property, plant and equipment, the number of employees, wages, and firm age (from the year of incorporation to the year of the leveraged buyout). Panel B presents operating income, EBITDA, cash holding, cash saving, and sales growth. Panel C reports the median values of current debt, long-term debt, total debt, and interest expenses. Panel D presents the median values of capital expenditures. Wilcoxon signed rank sum test p-values are presented for the difference between targets' median value and industry peer firms'. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Z-stat is also presented for the difference between private targets' median value and public targets'. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively Industry adjustment is made by the median value of the changes in each variable among companies in the same 2-digit SIC code. That is (Industry adjusted change in X)=(Change in X from year -1 to year Y)-(Median value of the change in X from year -1 to year Y in industry peer companies), where X is the variable of interest and Y is -2, 1, 2, or 3 relative to year -1 (one year before buyouts). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively for Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. This table presents the median changes in operating performance surrounding the year of leveraged buyouts for private targets with PE sponsors and those without PE sponsors. Operating performance is measured in several ways. 1) Percentage changes in EBITDA, 2) Percentage changes in EBITDA to operating assets (the average of current assets and tangible fixed assets) ratio, 3) Percentage changes in EBITDA to sales ratio, and 4) Percentage changes in EBITDA to the number of employees ratio. Industry adjustment is made by the median value of the changes in each variable among companies in the same 2-digit SIC code. That is (Industry adjusted change in X)=(Change in X from year -1 to year Y)-(Median value of the change in X from year -1 to year Y in industry peer companies), where X is the variable of interest and Y is -2, 1, 2, or 3 relative to year -1 (one year before buyouts). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively for Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. This figure depicts the change in corporate structure after a leveraged buyout. Typically one or more acquisition vehicles (TopCo and NewCo in this figure) are created for the purpose of the transaction. After NewCo is incorporated by management and/or private equity firms, it acquires Target and its subsidiaries. Subsequently, TopCo is created and acquire NewCo.Usually TopCo issues equity capital (private equity) and NewCo finances the transaction with debt.
(Source: Speechley, Acquisition Finance, 2008) 
